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FORD v. GEORGIA
111 S. Ct. 850 (1991)
United States Supreme Court

FACTS
James A. Ford was convicted ofkidnapping, rape and murder. At
trial, Ford filed a pretrial motion alleging that the county prosecutor
had "over a long period of time" excluded black persons from juries.
The issue was acute because Ford, a black man, had been charged with
raping and killing a white woman. The prosecution opposed the
motion, citing Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965), in which the
U.S. Supreme Court recognized that the deliberate exclusion of
members of the defendant's race from ajury would constitute a denial
of equal protection under the fourteenth amendment, but held that the
defendant would have to prove a pattern of racial discrimination in
prior cases.
The trial judge denied Ford's motion based upon his personal
observation and evaluation of the prosecutor's past conduct. During
jury selection, the prosecution exercised nine of its ten peremptory
challenges to strike black prospective jurors, leaving one black person
on the jury. After his conviction and death sentence Ford moved for
a new trial claiming that his right to an impartial jury had been
violated. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's
decision.
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and the case was
vacated and remanded for further consideration. 479 U.S. 1075
(1987). The basis for the remand was Batson v. Kentucky,, 476 U.S.
79 (1986), which was decided while Ford's petition for certiorari was
pending. Batson held that a black criminal defendant could make a
prima facie case of an equal protection violation with evidence that the
prosecutor had used peremptory challenges in defendant's case to
strike members of the defendant's race from the jury. Batson, 476
U.S. at 95.
On remand the Supreme Court of Georgia held that defendant's
equal protection claim was procedurally barred because a Batson
claim was never raised at trial. In addition, because Georgia case law
held that a Batson claim must be raised during the period between
selection of the jurors and the administration of their oaths, Ford's
motion was deemed untimely. The decision was again appealed and
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
HOLDING
The Supreme Court held that Ford had raised aBatson-type claim
and that the rule of procedure that the Georgia Supreme Court relied
upon was not an adequate and independent ground that would bar
review of defendant's claim.

ANALYSIS / APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
Batson lowered the level of proof required to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination. Whereas Swain had required proof of a

pattern of prior discrimination, Batson only required a showing of
discrimination based upon matters in the defendant's case. The
discrimination precipitating theBatsondecision was the prosecution's
use of peremptory challenges to strike black jurors. The Court found
that Ford had made a Batson-type claim in substance, even if not in
form.
Ford's pretrial motion did not mention the equal protection
clause, and the subsequent motion for a new trial cited the sixth
amendment, not the fourteenth. The state courts were deemed to have
conceeded that a Swain issue had been raised, and the Supreme Court
concluded that, since Swain and Batson were essentially the same
other than their respective proof requirements, Ford had in effect
raised a Batson claim.
With regard to the procedural bar asserted by the state court, the
Supreme Court acknowledged that because of the differing methods
ofjury selection among the states, the states could determine their own
procedural rules regarding the assertion of a Batson claim. "In any
given case, however, the sufficiency of such a rule to limit all review
of a constitutional claim itself depends upon the exercise of the local
power to setprocedure." Fordv.Georgia, 111 S. Ct. 850,857 (1991).
However, only a "firmly established and regularly followed state
practice" may be imposed by a state to prevent subsequent review of
a federal constitutional claim by federal court. Jamesv. Kentucky, 466
U.S. 341,348-51 (1984). The case support cited by the Georgia court
on remand was decided after Ford's trial. The Supreme Court would
not allow retroactive application of the procedural rule because Ford
had no notice of such procedure.
Since the rule was not firmly established at the time in question,
the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the matter to the Georgia
Supreme Court. If the Georgia court turns down Ford on the merits,
as it did with the Swain claim, then the Batson claim is not defaulted
and is preserved for federal review.
This case provides little new law, but it does demonstrate that not
every state decision based upon procedural default will be honored by
the Supreme Court. The Ford decision should provide encouragement to defense counsel in that it shows the potential benefit of
preserving issues. Ford benefited from a change in the law, but only
because he was deemed to have raised the matter, albeit awkwardly,
at the trial level. Thus, it is advisable to make timely objection to
colorable issues even if not accepted under the current law. See Rules
of Virginia Supreme Court 5:17, 5:22, 5:25 and 5:27.
Summary and analysis by:
Christopher J. Lonsbury

